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(decided February 19, 1991)
Just prior to printing, this case was reversed by the New York Court of
Appeals 1160 which adhered to its view, previously expressed in People v.
Burger,1161 that Vehicle and Traffic Law, section 415-a violates the New
York Constitution. The court held that "more is required to permit an
exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements embodied in article I
§ 12" 1162 than pervasive governmental supervision of defendant's industry.
The defendant, owner of an automobile dismantling yard,
challenged the state's use of evidence obtained from an adminis-
trative search of his yard authorized by Vehicle and Traffic Law
(VTL) section 415-a(5)(a) 1163 as the fruits of an unreasonable
search and seizure under the New York State Constitution. 1164
The Supreme Court, in New York v. Burger,1165 previously
rejected an identical challenge to VTL section 415-a(5)(a) on
federal constitutional grounds, overruling the New York Court of
Appeals. 1166 Therefore, the defendant's claim was confined to a
state constitutional challenge. The court of appeals held that the
administrative search conducted pursuant to VTL section 415-
a(5)(a) did not violate the state constitution, and reversed the
order granting defendant's motion to suppress. 1167
The police had randomly selected defendant's vehicle disman-
tling yard for an inspection, pursuant to their authority under the
1159. 165 A.D.2d 172, 567 N.Y.S.2d 738 (2d Dep't 1991), rev'd, People v.
Scott; People v. Keta, Nos. 6, 27, 1992 WL 62774 (N.Y. Apr. 2, 1992).
1160. People v. Scott; People v. Keta, Nos. 6, 27, 1992 WL 62774 (N.Y.
Apr. 2, 1992).
1161. 67 N.Y.2d 338, 493 N.E.2d 926, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1986), rev'd,
482 U.S. 691 (1987).
1162. Id. at 14. (referring to N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 12).
1163. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 415-a(5)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1992).
1164. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
1165. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
1166. Id. at 702.
1167. Keta, 165 A.D.2d at 183, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
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VTL. 116 8 After selecting an assortment of automotive parts from
the yard and recording their identification numbers, the police
"ran" these numbers through a computer located in their patrol
car. "Mhe officers discovered that some of these parts were
from automobiles which had been reported stolen." 1169 The
defendant was then asked to produce his "police book,"' 1170
which maintained records of all purchases of vehicle parts as
required by the statute. Examination of the police book revealed
that defendant had failed to record the suspect parts and he was
placed under arrest. A subsequent search of the yard, made after
the police had obtained a warrant, revealed thirty-five stolen
automobile parts. 1171 The defendant was charged with grand
larceny, possession of stolen property, and falsifying business
records. 1172 The defendant moved to suppress the evidence
obtained.
The hearing court granted the defendant's motion to suppress,
reasoning that the New York Court of Appeals had previously
determined that VTL section 415-a(5)(a) was unconstitutional un-
der the Fourth Amendment. 1173 Because the federal provision is
identical to the state provision, and because the court of appeals
has previously shown an inclination to "expand the right of citi-
zens by 'relying on State, rather than on more narrowly inter-
preted Federal grounds[,]' 1174 the hearing court concluded that
a more expansive interpretation was appropriate. The hearing
court thus granted the defendant's motion and the state appealed.
The appellate division was faced with the difficult task of eval-
uating the constitutionality of VTL section 415-a(5)(a) under the
state search and seizure provision, 1175 in light of the United




1172. Id. at 175, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 739-40.
1173. Id. at 175, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 740 (citing People v. Burger, 67 N.Y.2d
338, 493 N.E.2d 926, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1986), rev'd, 482 U.S. 691
(1987)).
1174. Id. at 177, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 741 (quoting People v. Keta, 142 Misc.
2d 986, 994, 538 N.Y.S.2d 417, 422, (1989)).
1175. See N.Y. CON T. art. I, § 12. Article I, § 12 is identical to the fourth
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States Supreme Court decision that held the statute constitutional
under the Fourth Amendment. 1176 New York case law suggests
that when the text of the state and federal constitutions is
identical, as it is here, a court is required to engage in
"noninterpretive analysis" before departing from the federal
standard. 1177 To fully understand the court's reasoning, it is
critical to first examine the federal standard detailed in New York
v. Burger. 1178 Next, it is important to define the requirements of
noninterpretive analysis. Finally, it is necessary to review the
second department's application of the facts of Keta to the non-
interpretive requirements.
Especially noteworthy is the second department's reluctance to
engage in this line of reasoning. The court began its analysis by
stating that the scope of rights afforded under the state constitu-
tion properly remains "the exclusive domain of the Court of
Appeals." 1179 Accordingly, the appellate court's decision was re-
strained in deference to the court of appeals' position as the
"policy-making tribunal" of New York State. 1180
The court of appeals, in striking down VTL section 415-a(5)(a)
in People v. Burger,1181 found that the authorized searches could
be "undertaken solely to uncover evidence of criminality and not
to enforce a comprehensive regulatory scheme." ' 1182 It also
found the statute did "little more than authorize general
searches" 1183 and, in actuality, functioned primarily as a
circumvention of the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
by allowing the police to search for stolen property in automobile
amendment of the United States Constitution.
1176. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
1177. Keta, 165 A.D.2d at 179, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 742; see also People v.
Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d 375, 378, 515 N.E.2d 898, 899, 521 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213
(1987); People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 303, 501 N.E.2d 556, 560, 508
N.Y.S.2d 907, 911 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
1178. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
1179. Keta, 165 A.D.2d at 177, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
1180. Id. at 177-78, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
1181. 67 N.Y.2d 338, 493 N.E.2d 926, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1986) rev'd,
482 U.S. 691 (1987).




et al.: Search & Seizure
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
SEARCH & SEIZURE
junkyards.
The United States Supreme Court, however, in reversing this
ruling in New York v. Burger,1184 held that a "[s]tate can address
a major social problem both by way of an administrative scheme
and through penal sanctions. 1 1185 Therefore, the fact that a
violator of VTL section 415-a(5)(a) suffered criminal penalties
did not invalidate its administrative purpose of "seeking to ensure
that vehicle dismantlers are legitimate businesspersons and that
stolen vehicles and vehicle parts passing through automobile
junkyards can be identified." 1186
The Court noted that the vehicle dismantling business has been
subject to pervasive government regulation, thus subjecting it to
the lessened expectation of privacy inherent in "closely
regulated" businesses. 1187 This lessened privacy expectation con-
tributes to the relaxation of the Fourth Amendment's warrant re-
quirement and permits the administrative search when three cri-
teria are met:
(1) [Tjhere must be a 'substantial' government interest that in-
forms the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is
made[;] (2) the warrantless inspections must be "necessary to
further the regulatory scheme[;]" and (3) "the statute's inspec-
tion program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its ap-
plication, [must] provid[e] a constitutionally adequate substitute
for a warrant." ' 1188
The Supreme Court found VTL section 415-a constitutional be-
cause it met the required criteria. It concluded that the state has a
substantial interest in closely regulating this business due to the
significant social problem of automobile theft and its association
with the vehicle dismantling industry. 1189 The Court then found
1184. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
1185. Id. at 712 (emphasis added). Warrantless administrative searches have
been a recognized exception to the fourth amendment requirements as long as
the authorizing statute serves a comprehensive, regulatory scheme. Id. at 702-
03.
1186. Id. at 714.
1187. Id. at 698 n.11, 699-701.
1188. Id. at 702-03 (citations omitted).
1189. Id. at 708.
1992] 1033
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that the regulatory scheme appropriately served the state interest
by controlling the major market for stolen automobiles and their
parts. 1190 The Court further reasoned that the owners of disman-
fling businesses are made fully aware of the possibility of admin-
istrative searches upon obtaining their state licenses. Because
those searches are conducted pursuant to the statute and "do not
constitute discretionary acts by government officials,"' 119 1 section
415-a(5) provides a "'constitutionally adequate substitute for a
warrant.' 1192 Finally, the Court found that "the 'time, place,
and scope' of the inspection is limited . . . to place appropriate
restraints upon the discretion of the inspecting officers.- 1193
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan agreed with the court
of appeals' analysis and stated that "[t]he fundamental defect in
§ 415-a(5) is that it authorizes searches intended solely to uncover
evidence of criminal acts."' 1194 He noted that the state used an
administrative scheme to provide a pretext for searching without
probable cause. 1195 Thus, he would have found VTL section 415-
a unconstitutional under the Federal Constitution.
The Keta court was faced with the clear reasoning of the
United States Supreme Court and was forced to review VTL sec-
tion 415-a under the principle of "noninterpretive" analysis. It
could not "'disregard the Supreme Court's decision merely be-
cause it disagree[d] with them or dislike[d] the result
reached.' ' 1 196 In those instances, a court must balance "the
historical significance and local character of the right in question
... against. . . the desirability of consistency and uniformity in
constitutional jurisprudence.- 1197 Considerations of separate state
law historically affording the individual greater protections at the
1190. Id. at 709.
1191. Id. at 711.
1192. Id. (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981)).
1193. Id. (quoting United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972)).
1194. Id. at 724.
1195. Id. at 725.
1196. Keta, 165 A.D.2d at 178, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 741 (quoting People v.
Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 80, 555 N.E.2d 915, 922, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518, 525
(1990) (Simons, J. concurring)).
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state level, 1198 such as "'peculiar State or local concerns,"' 1199
or distinctive state attitudes towards a right, 1200 have each been
utilized to expand individual rights on the state level over the
minimum federal standards.
The Keta court noted that, in the past, the court of appeals has
been most likely to offer greater individual protections at the state
level in the area of fundamental rights. This is because
fundamental rights have a "historically higher status in New
York"' 1201 and "affect a broad spectrum of the state's
citizenry." 1202
In contrast, the Keta court reasoned that the challenged statute
affected only a small minority of citizens - those engaged in the
vehicle dismantling industry. 1203 Further, the court noted that
this particular industry has been found by the legislature to be
suspect and therefore subject to regulation, due to its connection
to the stolen automobile trade. It found that the legislature was
addressing the social problem of automotive theft by attacldng
and regulating its marketplace. For these reasons, the court could
find no rationale for heightening protection for individuals subject
to administrative searches of automobile junkyards. VTL section
415-a was, therefore, found to be constitutional under the New
York Constitution. 1204
Justice Harwood dissented, finding VTL section 415-a violative
of the state constitution. He reasoned that the administrative
searches actually led to criminal punishment and hence allowed
police inspectors "cloaked by statute in administrative garb"' 1205
to engage in warrantless searches for possible automobile thefts in
1198. Id. at 179, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
1199. Id.
1200. Id.
1201. Id. at 180, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
1202. Id.
1203. Id. at 180, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
1204. Id. One week later, the second department affirmed its holding that
VTL § 415-a was constitutional and denied a second state constitutional
challenge in People v. Sessions, 170 A.D.2d 704, 567 N.Y.S.2d 116 (2d Dep't
1991).
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New York City. Since the authorized inspections "do nothing
more than enable police to ferret out crime," ' 1206 he would have
suppressed evidence resulting from these searches. He amply
documented New York's "long tradition of interpreting our State
Constitution to protect individual rights."' 1207 Additionally, he
stated his view that the appellate division could engage in consti-
tutional analysis which might expand individual rights under the
state constitution. He believes that this is often necessary and
should be performed because for most cases in New York, the
appellate division becomes the court of last resort for the parties.
THIRD DEPARTMENT
People v. Scott 12 0
8
(decided January 31, 1991)
Just prior to printing, this case was reversed by the New York Court of
Appeals 12 09 which concluded that the rule in Oliver v. United States
12 10
"does not adequately protect fundamental constitutional rights.,"12 11 Under
Oliver, "in areas outside the curtilage, an owner of 'open fields' enjoys no
Fourth Amendment protection." 12 12 The court claimed that "under the law of
this State the citizens are entitled to more protection," 12 13 and held that
"where landowners fence or post 'No Trespassing signs on their private
property . . . or. . . indicate unmistakably that entry is not permitted, the
expectation that their privacy rights will be respected and . . . free from
unwanted intrusions is reasonable." 1
2 14
A criminal defendant alleged that his right to be protected
1206. Id. at 185, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 746 (Harwood, J., dissenting).
1207. Id. at 188, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 748 (citing People v. P.J. Video, 68
N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986)).
1208. 169 A.D.2d 1023, 565 N.Y.S.2d 576 (3d Dep't 1991), rev'd, People
v. Scott; People v. Keta, Nos. 6, 27, 1992 WL 62774 (N.Y. Apr. 2, 1992).
1209. People v. Scott; People v. Keta, Nos. 6, 27, 1992 WL 62774 (N.Y.
Apr. 2, 1992).
1210. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
1211. People v. Scott, 1992 WL 62774.
1212. Id.
1213. Id. at 6.
1214. Id. at 9.
1036 [Vol 8
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